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This paper provides an overview of the efforts of successive Zambian governments 
to transform and institutionalise democratic local governance, and to come to grips 
with the socio-economic development challenges facing the country. It assesses the 
progress and challenges that governments are facing in their efforts to transform 
local government into democratic, developmental local governance. 
 
Local governance reform has been transforming the structure of governance in 
Zambia. Since the country attained political independence from Britain in 1964, a 
commitment to decentralisation and popular participation has been an important 
component of local governance reform strategies. The problem that confronted the 
government at independence was one of transforming the inherited provincial and 
district government structures into a dynamic local governance framework that 
could facilitate sustainable public participation in the socio-economic development 
strategies envisaged by the new regime. The officially stated policy has been one of 
“taking power to the people” (Zambia, 1972:33), and a critical objective of the 
local governance reforms has been to strengthen local authorities by the 
decentralisation of power. Consequently, over the years governments have sought 
to design and implement decentralised democratic local governance to facilitate 
wider participation by the citizenry and facilitate effective service delivery. 
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2. Local Governance Reforms 
This section provides an overview of the reforms implemented in four phases 
between 1964 and 2008. 
 
Phase I: 1964-1970 
The initial phase entailed the new government’s attempts to establish political 
control and transform the inherited provincial and district government structures 
into cohesive, dynamic organisations of local development management, which 
could facilitate sustainable socio-economic development (Chikulo, 1981, 1985a). 
 
 
On gaining independence in October 1964, Zambia inherited a dual system of 
administration. This comprised central government field administration and elected 
local government. Zambia was divided into eight provinces consisting of 44 
districts. At the sub-district level there were Native Authorities in the rural areas. 
1965 saw the abolition of Native Authorities, which were viewed as symbols of 
colonial repression and manipulation, and the introduction of new local 
governments under the Local Government Act (No.30) of 1965. Under this Act, 67 
local authorities were established: 24 were urban authorities, and 43 were rural 
councils. The Act gave local authorities wide-ranging powers to discharge over 
sixty functions in their areas of jurisdiction. 
 
In November 1968, the government announced reforms which entailed 
‘decentralization in centralism’. As the then President Kaunda (1968:19) 
elaborated: 
 
“I define this decentralization in centralism as a measure whereby through the 
Party and Government machinery, we will decentralize most of your Party and 
Government activities. While retaining effective control of the party and 
Government machinery at the centre in the interests of unity.” 
 
At the district level, these reforms involved the appointment of a District Governor 
(DG) to head each of the 53 districts. The DG became the politico-administrative 
head of the district. He was the personal representative – alter ego – of the 
President, and performed this role through the various committees he chaired in the 
district. Thus during this phase the government sought to institute political control 
over field administration, hence the emphasis on cohesion and the need to build a 
centralized polity (Chikulo, 1981). 
 
Phase II: 1971-1979 
The second phase involved efforts by the government to create a network of 
‘grassroots participatory’ structures between the local authorities and the sub-
district level in order to facilitate public participation (Zambia, 1971). The abolition 
of Native Authorities had created an institutional gap between the local authorities 
and the sub-district level. In order to plug this gap village productivity committees, 
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ward councils and ward development committees were established under the 
Village Registration and Development Act (No. 30) of 1971. This made the village 
the primary focus at district level. Under the provisions of the Act, a village 
productivity committee (VPC) was established in each village, sitting under the 
chairmanship of the village headman. The VPC was responsible for considering the 
administrative and development needs of the community and sending 
representatives to the ward development committees (WDCs). A WDC was 
established in every local government ward – a ward being an area within a local 
authority from which a councillor is elected under the provisions of the 1965 Local 
Government Act. The functions of WDCs were to consider development needs, get 
ideas from VPCs, and pass these on to the local authority. This network of 
committees was supposed to provide the basis for decentralized local governance. 
 
Phase III:  1980-1990 
On 13th December 1972 Zambia was formally proclaimed a ‘One-Party 
Participatory Democracy’, thereby granting the ruling party constitutional 
paramountcy over the entire state administrative apparatus. As then President 
Kaunda (1973) aptly put it:  
 
“The Party is supreme in our One-Party Participatory Democracy. It is the source 
of national policy. The Party will not only be interested in working out broad 
policies and objectives, it will be directly involved in the planning, organization, 
control and management of the entire administrative machinery of our nation”. 
 
This phase witnessed increased politicisation and the imposition of the supremacy 
of the party over local governance (Chikulo, 1985b, 1989). Consequently, the 
central and local government administration was merged with the ruling party 
(UNIP) structures, to create an integrated district administration, under the 1980 
Local Administration Act (No.15). The major objective of the 1980 Act was to 
“…ensure the effective integration of the primary organs of the party and other 
local administration units in the district.”  
 
The most significant structural change entailed in the 1980 Act was the abolition of 
the distinction between party, central and local governments. This involved the 
establishment of an administrative structure composed of party, central and local 
government officials. The stated goal of the reforms was to integrate local 
administrative departments of the central government, local councils, and the party 
structure in order to improve coordination and eliminate duplication among them. 
Consequently, a single integrated politico-administrative structure was created in 
each of the fifty-five districts, to which was assigned the totality of party, central 
and local government activity. A single administrative agency called the district 
council was established in each district under the chairmanship of a centrally-
appointed political appointee – the District Governor. The council was a statutory, 
deliberative, and consultative body, concerned with the determination of broad 
policy objectives and critical assessment of development programmes. 
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The new councils went beyond what Leemans (1970:53) called ‘a single hierarchy 
model’ of government at district level, since they replaced the former tripartite 
local government framework, including the incorporation of the party organization 
into the new structure. As a consequence, the new structure of local government 
not only brought the decision-making process closer to the public at district level, 
but also ensured closer party control over the mechanism of field administration. 
Thus political control was considered crucial for the effective functioning of the 
new system of local administration. 
At the sub-district level, the 1980 reforms were designed to reinvigorate the 
administrative structures by eliminating the duplication of work between party 
committees and local government committees. Consequently, the party 
organizations from constituency to section level were merged with ward 
development committees and village productivity committees into a single set of 
structures vertically integrated with the district council. These performed both the 
functions assigned to the party committees by the UNIP Constitution, and the 
functions assigned by the 1971 Village Registration and Development Act. The 
single hierarchy of committees consisted of ward, branch and section committees. 
Local government elections were abolished and replaced with party elections. Party 
officials elected as ward chairmen, represented the ward on the council. The 1980 
Act increased the representation of local party members and excluded the majority 
of local residents who were not members. As a consequence, democratic local 
governance was undermined at the local level, as the party representatives were not 
elected by universal adult suffrage, yet they were expected to represent and take 
decisions on behalf of local communities. 
 
The system of local governance established by the 1980 reforms was, therefore, 
basically an attempt to create an institutional synthesis between local government, 
central government, and the party. It thus approximated what Coleman and 
Rosberg (1964) called a ‘party-state’, in which, in order to achieve higher levels of 
mobilization for socio-economic development, the distinction between civil servant 
and politician was blurred and the relationship between them transformed. 
 
Phase IV: 1991- 2008 
A clamour for multi-party democracy led to the scrapping of the de jure one-party 
state in December 1990, and the introduction of political pluralism (Chikulo, 
1996). Consequently, the transition to a multi-party system demanded a 
restructuring of local government. Firstly, local government had to be ‘de-linked’ 
from the ruling party; and secondly, measures were introduced to strengthen 
democratic control over administration, and increase its accountability to 
democratically elected bodies. The promulgation in August 1991 of the 
Constitution of Zambia Act (No.1) and the Local Government Act (No.22), ‘de-
linked’ the ruling party from all civil service and state apparatus, repealed the 1980 
Local Administration Act (No.15), and re-introduced the distinction between the 
ruling party, the central government, and local government. 
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In addition, the 1991 Local Government Elections Act (No.26) re-introduced 
universal adult suffrage at the local government level. This democratised local 
government by affording every citizen who is a registered voter an opportunity to 
stand for election, or vote for the candidate of his choice, irrespective of political 
affiliation. The Act provides for the demarcation of the council’s area of 
jurisdiction into wards from which councillors are elected for a five-year term.  
 
3. Current Structure of Local Governance 
The current system of local government in Zambia flows from the fourth phase of 
reforms. The Constitution of Zambia provides for the establishment of a 
democratically elected local government system based on universal suffrage, whilst 
the 1991 Local Government Act provides for a single-tier system of local 
government comprising three types of councils: city, municipal and district. 
  
There are 72 local authorities countrywide:  
 
• 4 are designated as City Councils 
• 12 are Municipal Councils  
• 56 are District Councils (comprised of smaller rural-based local 
authorities). 
 
The composition of councils is as follows: 
 
• All elected councillors in the district 
• All members of parliament in the district 
• Two representatives appointed by all chiefs in the district – as a means of 
involving traditional rulers in local governance.  
 
The 1991 Local Government Act provides for the establishment of a Local 
Government Electoral Commission to administer local government elections. 
Councillors are elected every five years. Initially, this was only three years, but the 
Local Government (Amendment) Act (No.8) of 2004 provided for a change of 
tenure to five years, in order to align it with presidential and parliamentary 
elections.  
 
Councillors elect mayors and deputy mayors every year in the city and municipal 
councils, and chairmen and deputy chairmen in district councils, from amongst 
themselves. Members of parliament and chiefs’ representatives are not eligible for 
these positions. The mayor/chairperson is the political head of the council and 
performs ceremonial functions, but lacks executive powers. The town clerk or 
district secretary is the executive head of the council.  
 
The Local Government Act of 1991 (as amended several times) empowers all 
categories of local authorities to undertake wide-ranging functions. The councils 
are recognised as the primary bodies responsible for development at district level. 
They are the statutory deliberative and consultative bodies concerned with the 
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determination of broad policy objectives and critical assessment of development 
programmes, as well as the efficient and effective management of their areas. 
Consequently, the Act gives sixty-three scheduled functions to the councils, which 
include among others the provision of services such as water supply, sewerage, 
health, feeder and district roads, education and housing. Thus the 1991 Act has 
strengthened the role of councils as focal points for wider participation and 
delivery of social services to the local communities. 
 
With regard to finance, the Act gave councils powers to raise and utilize revenue 
from their own local sources at their discretion. In addition, councils receive 
transfers of funds from central government, which are supposed to be their major 
source of revenue. The transfers are firstly, the means by which the central 
government shares taxes with councils; and secondly, provide a conduit through 
which various grants from sector ministries are disbursed to enable councils to 
undertake delegated functions on their behalf. These grants take various forms 
consisting of general, special and capital grants. Special grants are meant for 
financing projects which are prior-earmarked by central government. Capital grants 
are meant to be used for financing capital projects, while general grants are 
additional financial resources extended to district councils.  
 
4. Key Challenges to Effective Local Governance 
Legal, policy and institutional frameworks have been put in place to establish and 
democratise local governments, with the objective of deepening democracy and 
improving service delivery. However, there are three key challenges affecting the 
effectiveness of local governance (Chikulo, 2000; Zambia, 2002a and b). 
 
Financial Crisis  
Raising sufficient revenue is one of the most intractable problems facing most local 
authorities, and the majority of councils are unable to meet their statutory functions 
and obligations. Although the 1991 Local Government Act has given councils vast 
powers to raise and generate their own revenues, few are able to take advantage of 
this provision due the fact that their resource base is too small to sustain their 
operations. As a result, local authorities have accumulated crushing burdens of debt 
or arrears and are now faced with financial crises (Crook and Manor, 2001). Few 
can stand on their own feet.  
 
In addition, government actions and policies have exacerbated the financial 
problems of councils, which face severe resource constraints due to the following: 
 
• Declining and erratic disbursements of grants from central government 
• Erosion of asset base through various actions and policies of the central 
government such as the 1992 directive to councils to disinvest in 
commercial ventures and sell rental housing stock at uneconomical prices 
• Unfunded mandates – local authorities given increasing responsibilities 
without corresponding capacity in resource mobilization 
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• Redirection of funds intended for local authorities to the control of local 
politicians, for example constituency development funds and youth 
projects funds controlled by MPs, or to semi-autonomous local institutions 
such as the Health and Education Management Boards created to perform 
specific functions on behalf of sector ministries. 
 
This lack of resources has left significant gaps in service delivery capacity and 
placed limitations on the extent of to which stakeholders can participate in 
development management. Without financial sustainability, local authorities are 
unable to effectively provide services to their communities, and their 
developmental capacity and autonomy are thereby undermined.   
 
Lack of Integrated District Development Management and Planning 
There is a lack of holistic, integrated planning and management at district level. 
Effective integrated planning and management is undermined by the absence of an 
effective coordinating mechanism under the direct control of the council. District 
Development Coordination Committees (DDCCs) were established in 1993 as 
forums for planning and implementation of development activities, as well as 
community participation. They are technical committees mandated to coordinate 
development activities in the district and prepare development plans for submission 
to the district council. The DDCC is composed of heads of central government 
departments and other development agencies represented in the district, as well as 
the executives of the district councils. Thus, the majority of the members are 
bureaucrats representing central government departments, and are answerable to 
their parent ministry, not the local authority. The council has no legal 
administrative authority over central government line ministries. The 
deconcentrated sector ministries which provide services within the council’s area 
of jurisdiction, report direct to their parent ministries in the capital city of Lusaka. 
Thus they remain primarily responsible to their ministerial chain of command. The 
DDCC is thus rendered ineffective because it has no legal authority to back up its 
operations, and the council has no control over its operations. 
 
The Extent of Meaningful Citizen Participation in Local Governance 
The major weakness in the current local governance system is the lack of legally 
constituted local government institutions at the local, ward or area level. There is 
no forum for community participation in decision-making on local development 
activities and affairs. Under the 1991 Local Government Act, each council’s area of 
jurisdiction is demarcated into wards. However, these wards at the sub-district level 
are only recognized for purposes of local government elections. As noted earlier, 
under the previous system of local government, a network of village productivity 
committees, ward councils and ward development committees had been established 
to facilitate development and induce participation. These ‘grassroots participatory 
structures’ made the local council the primary focus of development at district 
level. However, under the 1991 Act ward development committees and village 
productivity committees are not formally linked to local authorities and are thus no 
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longer functional in most instances. The result has been the creation of an 
‘institutional vacuum’, with no effective forum for community participation in 
decision-making on local development activities and issues at sub-district level. 
Thus although local authorities are accountable to the ratepayers, opinion polls 
indicate that most people feel councillors do not reflect their views in the council 
and are not accountable to residents (Moomba, 2002:29; Lolojih, 2003:16). Studies 
have also shown that the public have little trust in local government and there is a 




Although local governance reforms have brought about significant changes in 
policy frameworks and institutional structures, in order to facilitate and anchor 
effective delivery of socio-economic development services, local authorities are 
faced with difficult constraints and challenges. The strength of decentralised local 
governance remains limited. For it to be effective, not only should local 
governance be downwardly accountable, but other central government agencies and 
bodies at district level should also be accountable to local government. The 
argument that democratic decentralised local governance can deliver services more 
efficiently and more responsively depends on the adequate provision of resources. 
Yet lack of financial resources continues to constrain the effectiveness of local 
authorities. The failure to fully empower local authorities undermines their 
effectiveness and legitimacy.  
 
References 
Chikulo, B.C. 1981. ‘The Zambian Administrative Reforms: An Alternative View’, Public 
Administration and Development, vol. 1(1), pp. 55-65. 
Chikulo, B.C. 1985a. ‘Decentralization in Centralism: An Analysis of the Zambian 
Experience, 1964-1984’, in M. Ndulo and K. Oseihwedie (eds), Issues in Zambian 
Development, Omenan Press, Roxbury. 
Chikulo, B.C. 1985b. ‘Reorganization for Local Administration in Zambia: An Analysis of 
the Local Administration Act, 1980’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 
5(1), pp. 73-81. 
Chikulo, B.C. 1989. ‘The Zambian Local Administration Act, 1980: Problems of 
Implementation’, Planning and Administration, vol. 16(1), pp. 62-67. 
Chikulo, B.C. 1996. ‘Local Government in the Third Republic’, in O. Sichone and B.C. 
Chikulo (eds), Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third Republic, SAPES 
Books, Harare. 
Chikulo, B.C. 2000. ‘Decentralization for Good Governance and Development: The 
Zambian Experience’, Regional Development Dialogue, vol. 21(1), pp. 26-48. 
Crook, R. and J. Manor, 2001. Local Governance and Decentralization in Zambia, Final 
Report to SNV, The Ministry of Local Government and Housing and the Donor 
Reference Group, Lusaka. 
Erdmann, G. and N. Simutanyi, 2003. Transition in Zambia: The Hybridization of the Third 
Republic, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Lilongwe. 
CHIKULO: Local Governance Reforms in Zambia: A Review 
 
 
 CJLG January 2009 106 
 
Government of Zambia, 1971. Village Productivity and Ward Development Committees, 
Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Government of Zambia, 1972. Humanism in Zambia: and A Guide to its Implementation, 
Parts I and II, Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Government of Zambia, 2002a. The National Decentralisation Policy: Towards 
Empowering the People, Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Government of Zambia, 2002b. Africa Governance Forum V: Local Governance and 
Poverty Reduction: Zambia Country Paper, Government Printer, Lusaka. 
Kaunda, K.D. 1968. Zambia’s Guidelines for the Next Decade, Government Printer, 
Lusaka. 
Kaunda, K.D. 1973. Speech to the UNIP National Council, Lusaka (mimeo). 
Coleman, J.S. and C. Rosberg (eds), 1964. Political Parties and National Integration in 
Tropical Africa, University of California press, Berkeley. 
Leemans, A.F. 1970. New Patterns of Local Government, IULA, The Hague. 
Lolojih, P.K. 2003. Report on making Local Authorities more Effective, Transparent and 
Accountable: An Analysis of Opinion Polls, Public Radio and Television discussions, 
TI–Zambia, Lusaka. 
Momba, J.C. 2002. Report on Problems of Effectiveness in Service Delivery, Accountability 
and Transparency of Local Authorities in Zambia, TI-Zambia, Lusaka. 
Sichone, O. and B.C. Chikulo, 1996. Democracy in Zambia: Challenges for the Third 
Republic, Sapes Books, Harare. 
 
